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215 South State Street 12th Floor 
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Clerk, Supreme Court, U?2t < 
STATEMENT OF UNCONTESTED FACTS 
1. Respondent Regional Sales, Inc., having submitted its brief on 
this issue as requested by this Court, has not contested the facts raised by 
Appellant in his Supplemental Brief, to wit: 
a. Bryce E. Roe, counsel for Respondent, became 
associated with the corporate firm of Fabian & Clendenin 
during the course of these proceedings, at the trial level. 
b. Appellant and his counsel at the trial level, 
Ephraim H. Fankhauser, were unaware of the association of 
Mr. Roe with Fabian & Clendenin until about April 6, 1990, 
after the entry of the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
written by Judge Judith Billings. 
c. Judge Billings is married to Thomas T. Billings of 
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, a Salt Lake City law 
firm. 
d. Thomas T. Billings is the son of Peter W. 
Billings, Sr., and brother of Peter W. Billings, Jr., both of 
whom are officers, directors, agents and shareholders of the 
corporate law firm of Fabian & Clendenin. 
e. Judge Billings regularly disqualifies herself in 
proceedings in which she is related to attorneys in the law firm 
through affinity within the third degree of relationship. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Respondent's attempts to downplay the significance of the 
constitutional rights of due process discussed in the case of In Re. 
Murchison. 349 U.S. 143, 99 L.ed 942, 75 S.Ct. 623 (1954) is 
inappropriate. It is that very disparagement of Mr. Reichert's 
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constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial and appeal which should be 
addressed, and vindicated, by this court. While Respondent's arguments 
address the existence of actual bias or probable bias, Appellant's reminds 
the parties and the Supreme Court stated unequivocally that "justice must 
satisfy the appearance of justice." (Murchison in S.Ct. at 625) Therefore, 
Appellant need not demonstrate actual or even probable bias in order to 
demonstrate a violation of constitutional due process guarantees. This 
sentiment was echoed clearly in the Utah case of Anderson v. Industrial 
Com'n of Utah. 696 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1985), a case which Respondent 
failed to address at all: 
Fairness requires not only an absence of actual bias, but 
endeavors to prevent even the possibility of unfairness. 
Anderson at 1221. 
The due process rights of Appellant can be tested by resort to three 
sources of law: common law, Utah statute, the Utah Code of Judicial 
Responsibility. Since Utah has enacted a statute regarding disqualification 
due to relationship to a "party" to an action which is in conflict with the 
common law cited by Respondent, the Utah statute has abrogated the 
common law doctrines cited. The common law therefore does not concern 
us here. 
Under the Utah statute (§78-7-1, Utah Code Ann., hereinafter 
"UCA") a judge must disqualify herself due to any relationship of 
consanguinity or affinity within the third degree to a party in the action. 
The issue arises as to whether or not Judge Billings' relationship to the 
corporate firm of Fabian & Clendenin is a relationship of "judge" to 
"party". An attorney, in this case Fabian & Clendenin through Bryce E. 
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Roe, has herein applied for attorney's fees which are hourly, and not 
contingency in nature. 50 A.L.R.2d 161 (at §11) states: 
Where a party to a suit applies to the court for counsel 
fees, his attorney becomes a party within the meaning of 
a statute disqualifying a judge because of his relationship 
to party, and the judge related to such attorney has been 
held to be disqualified, (emphasis added) 
(See also Roberts v. Roberts. 115 Ga. 259,41 S.E. 616, 90 Am At Rep 108 
(1902); Brown v. Brown. 103 Kan 53, 172 P. 1005 (1918); Postal Mut. 
Indem. Co. v. Ellis. 140 Tex 570, 169 S.W.2d 482 reversing 161 S.W.2d 
1114, (1943); Avalon Apts. Co. v. Sammons. 220 Ind 319, 33 N.E.2d 846, 
42 N.E.2d 626 (1942); See especially Cavanaugh v. District Ct.. 163 Iowa 
76, 144 N.W.25 (1913) in which the attorney appearing before the judge 
was merely an associate of the judge's son.) Such is the case here. 
Respondent has applied for, and received, attorney's fees. Judge Billings, 
and the Utah Court of Appeals panel which joined in her opinion, reversed 
and remanded this very issue to the trial court, not to diminish the amount 
of fees but only to possibly increase that amount. The corporate firm of 
Fabian & Clendenin were and are parties within the meaning of UCA §78-
7-1, inappropriately related to Judge Billings according to that statute. Her 
bias appears to be actual, probable or possible under all conceivable 
scenarios upon examination of the attorney's fee question. The 
disqualification of Judge Billings was and is therefore unavoidable under 
UCA §78-7-1, since Fabian & Clendenin was a "party" under the statute 
and since Mr. Reichert "did not consent" to her continued involvement in 
the case. 
The third source of information under which Appellant's 
constitutional right of due process and fairness can be analyzed is under the 
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Canons of ethics governing the conduct of judges. This has been treated at 
length already in previous briefs. Nevertheless, Respondent argues that 
Appellant must prove actual bias through the amount of fees which Fabian 
& Clendenin would receive as attorney's fees in this action. Aside from the 
fact that actual bias is not required in order to require disqualification, the 
Canons relied upon by Appellant do not exclusively require a financial 
interest on the part of the person inappropriately related to the judge. 
Canon 3(C)3(c) provides a definition of "financial interest" as used in 
judicial ethics as "ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however 
small". Respondents admit that the shareholders of Fabian & Clendenin, 
among them Peter W. Billings Sr. and Peter W. Billings Jr., that the fees 
involved in this case would constitute at least one-half of one percent of the 
firms annual earnings, out of which shareholders, officers, agents and 
others in the firm would be paid. This is certainly an ownership and 
financial interest in the firm, "however small", i 
Although several of the provision of Canon 3(C) involve 
disqualification based upon a "financial interest" as defined, and actually 
employ the term "financial interest" (see Canon 3(C)(1)(c) for example), 
Canon 3(C)(1)(d), which Mr. Reichert cites frequently does not employ 
that term at all. Instead, Canon 3(l)(C)(d)(iii) requires disqualification if a 
person related to the judge is known to have "an interest" in the outcome of 
the proceeding. Therefore, not only do the firm of Fabian & Clendenin 
and Peter W. Billings Sr. and Jr. have an actual prohibited financial 
interest, they have other interests which Appellant has heretofore detailed 
in part. 
Disqualification of Judge Billings is unavoidable in order to vindicate 
and enforce the due process rights of Mr. Reichert under the 
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Constitution,!^A §78-7-1 and the Code of Judicial Conduct. This Court is 
called upon to vindicate and enforce these rights by vacating the opinion of 
the Court of Appeals. 
2. Respondent attempts to entice this Court to embark upon a 
"fishing" expedition for "red herrings", which this Court should disregard. 
Among the enticements offered by Respondent are arguments for the 
application of Federal law and vague references to separation of powers. 
Respondent cites Federal case law which enforces a statue requiring 
disqualification of Federal judges, seeking its application to Utah State 
Court judges in lieu of the Utah statute, and the Utah Code of Judicial 
Conduct. The particular statute relied upon in Voltman v. United Fruit Co. 
cited by Respondents, is §28 U.S.C.A. 455. This statute is inapplicable 
here: 
Disqualification of justice, judge or magistrate. 
(a) Any justice, judge or magistrate of the United States 
shall disqualify himself, [etc.] (emphasis added) 
The statute relied upon by Respondent is strictly applicable to Federal 
Judges only. The Utah statutes and Canons cited, in addition to due process 
considerations are the appropriate law before this court. 
Respondent relies upon some vague notion of separation of powers 
on pages 4 and 5 of its brief. With respect, the doctrine of separation of 
powers has no application here. Likewise, citation of the ABA Code is not 
applicable or useful in light of clear Utah Canons and statute. Therefore, 
the definitions of "knowingly", etc., provided bv Respondent are deemed 
irrelevant to the issue at hand. 
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Respondent attempts to relieve Judge Billings of ethical and statutory 
duties and responsibilities to disqualify herself in this case merely based 
upon the fact that the proceeding involved was at an appellate level. This is 
another red herring. Nowhere in the due process clause or the Supreme 
Court cases interpreting it, or in UCA §78-7-1 or Canon 3(C) is any 
differentiation made based upon the fact that the judge involved was an 
appellate judge. This Court should not fall into the error advocated by 
Respondent in this regard. The impartiality of a judge, and a party's right 
to fairness and impartiality, is equally important at the appellate level as at 
any other level of judicial proceeding. This Court now has the opportunity 
to make that fact clear by vacating the opinion of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
3. Judge Billings herself has already provided the basis for 
vacating the opinion below, by means of her previous pattern of 
disqualification, acknowledged by Respondent in its brief at page 9 
(Conclusion). This fact is persuasive for vacating the opinion below. 
CONCLUSION 
Due process and fundamental fairness require the disqualification of 
Judge Billings and vacating the opinion authored by her in the Utah Court 
of Appeals, due to her relationship to Peter W. Billings Sr. and Jr.. Fabian 
& Clendenin itself became a party to this litigation for purposes of 
disqualification of Judge Billings under UCA §78-7-1. Furthermore, under 
the Code of Judicial Conduct, Judge Billings should have entered her 
disqualification since Fabian & Clendenin have interests which could be 
substantially effected by the outcome of the case, in addition to admitted 
financial interests which meet the Code's definition of "however small". 
This Court should vacate the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals and to 
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reinstate the verdict of the trial court in its entirety. Appellant requests 
this relief. Due process, fundamental fairness and equity demand it. 
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of March, 1991. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that 1 served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Reply to Respondent's Supplemental Brief by mailing a copy of 
the same, first class, postage prepaid, this 29th day of March, 1991, to the 
following: 
BRYCE E. ROE 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 South State Street 12th Floor 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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